Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism

Autor/in	Westphal, Kenneth R.
Titel	Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism
Quelle	In: Theory and Research in Education, 10 (2012) 1, S.3-25 (23 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1477-8785
DOI	10.1177/1477878512437477
Schlagwörter	Philosophy; Value Judgment; Liberal Arts; Moral Development; Moral Values; Educational Philosophy; Role; Educational Theories + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Philosophie; Werturteil; Moralische Entwicklung; Moral value; Ethischer Wert; Bildungsphilosophie; Erziehungsphilosophie; Rollen; Educational theory; Theory of education; Bildungstheorie
Abstract	Moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, has become prominent both in moral philosophy and in philosophy of education. This article re-examines Nussbaum's case for particularism, based on Sophocles' "Antigone", because her stress on sensitive appreciation of circumstantial specifics is salutary, though it cannot justify particularism because the problem lies not with moral principles, nor with moral judgment, but with a constricted and untenable view of rational judgment as simple syllogistic ratiocination. To improve our understanding of the central role of principles in moral judgment and in educational theory, this article explicates "mature judgment" and highlights key features of Thomas Green's account of norm acquisition, and of Kant's account of the autonomy of rational judgment. These provide a basis for justifying liberal arts education in today's context. (Contains 26 notes.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10