How Outside Opportunities Affect Alliance Governance: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry

Autor/in	Kim, Jongwook
Titel	How Outside Opportunities Affect Alliance Governance: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry
Quelle	In: International Journal of Learning and Change, 10 (2018) 2, S.113-130 (18 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1740-2875
DOI	10.1504/IJLC.2018.10010852
Schlagwörter	Governance; Biotechnology; Genetics; Regression (Statistics); Partnerships in Education; Models; Institutional Cooperation; Business; Statistical Analysis + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Education; Educational policy; Financing; Steuerung; Bildung; Erziehung; Bildungspolitik; Finanzierung; Biotechnologie; Humangenetik; Regression; Regressionsanalyse; Hochschulpartnerschaft; Analogiemodell; Institute; Co-operation; Cooperation; Institut; Kooperation; Business studies; Wirtschaft; Betriebswirtschaft; Statistische Analyse
Abstract	In complex interfirm exchange relationships like alliances, firms that invest in relation-specific assets are likely to devise governance mechanisms, most prominently hierarchical control, to safeguard against various exchange hazards. However, if investing in relation-specific assets leads the focal alliance firm to discover new opportunities outside of the exchange relationship that can be exploited independent of its partner firm, then instead of seeking more control over the alliance, we may see such firms' incentives for seeking control over the alliance to be weakened. These different conditions are contrasted and explored empirically in the biotechnology alliance setting. Understanding the role of outside opportunities as an important driver of alliance governance can help to integrate the governance literature and the capabilities literature. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01