Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
| Autor/inn/en | Klein, Nicolas Alexandre; Rady, Sven |
|---|---|
| Titel | Negatively correlated bandits. This version: January 23, 2008. |
| Quelle | Erlangen u.a.: Friedrich-Alexander-Univ. (2008), 24 S.
PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (1); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (2) |
| Reihe | BGPE discussion paper. 40 |
| Beigaben | grafische Darstellungen |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Dokumenttyp | online; Monographie; Graue Literatur |
| Schlagwörter | Entscheidung; Erwartung; Spieltheorie; Lernen; Markowscher Prozess; Gewinn; Arbeitspapier; Risiko; Theorie |
| Abstract | We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly negatively correlated between players. In marked contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type, we find that learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the stakes exceed a certain threshold, and that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies. For low stakes, the equilibrium is unique, symmetric, and coincides with the planner's solution. For high stakes, the equilibrium is unique, symmetric, and tantamount to myopic behavior. For intermediate stakes, there is a continuum of equilibria. |
| Erfasst von | ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel |
| Update | 2013/4 |
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