On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic

Autor/in	Wright, Jennifer Cole
Titel	On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic
Quelle	In: Cognition, 115 (2010) 3, S.491-503 (13 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0010-0277
DOI	10.1016/j.cognition.2010.02.003
Schlagwörter	Intuition; Epistemology; Inquiry; Bias; Evaluation Methods; Schemata (Cognition); Case Studies; Models + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Erkenntnistheorie; Cognition; Schema; Kognition; Case study; Fallstudie; Case Study; Analogiemodell
Abstract	Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people's concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ''calibrate'' our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people's concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also that people have introspective awareness of this stability, providing a promising means by which to assess the epistemic value of our intuitions. (Contains 10 figures.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10