Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience

Autor/inn/en	Gillihan, Seth J.; Farah, Martha J.
Titel	Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Quelle	In: Psychological Bulletin, 131 (2005) 1, S.76-97 (22 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0033-2909
Schlagwörter	Experimental Psychology; Cognitive Processes; Neuropsychology + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Experimentelle Psychologie; Cognitive process; Kognitiver Prozess; Neuropsychologie
Abstract	Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self. (Author).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10