Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/in | Cigno, Alessandro |
---|---|
Titel | How to deal with covert child labour, and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country. An optimal taxation problem with moral hazard. |
Quelle | Tokyo: Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University (2010), 16 S., 140 KB
PDF als Volltext (1); PDF als Volltext (2); PDF als Volltext (3) |
Reihe | PIE - CIS discussion paper. 474 |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | online; Monographie; Graue Literatur |
Schlagwörter | Bildungsverhalten; Schule; Moral; Finanzierung; Kinderarbeit; Steuer; Subventionierung; Arbeitspapier; Risiko; Theorie |
Abstract | As the return to education (and possibly also parental income) is uncertain, and given that the work a child does covertly for his own parents, and transfers between parents and children, are private information, the government should make school enrollment compulsory, set a legal limit (decreasing in parental income) on overt child labour, and redistribute across families using a flat-rate education grant, and a tax on parental income. That done, it should use a scholarship increasing in school results, and a tax on the skill premium, to raise the expected return to educational investment, and make it less uncertain. |
Erfasst von | ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel |
Update | 2011/2 |